Warum steigende Renditen japanischer Anleihen kein Negativfaktor sind

Japanese government bond (JGB) yields have jumped lately, and with them, warnings they will pull the rug out from under global markets are rising across financial coverage we monitor.^[i] To hear bearish commentators we follow tell it, higher JGB yields risk reversing a supposed source of cheap borrowing that has pumped up world stocks. But we think a closer look reveals this to be a false alarm.

As Exhibit 1 shows, 10-year JGB yields are hitting 19-year highs, almost doubling from 1.1% at 2025’s start to just under 2.0% today. Now, we find higher yields in and of themselves make sense: Inflation (the rate of change in prices economywide)—and expectations for it—are bond yields’ main driver, and those have climbed in Japan. Inflation erodes currencies’ purchasing power, so when it is expected to rise, yields on fixed-income instruments typically also climb to compensate. This explains the uptick, in our view, helped along by the Bank of Japan normalising policy and gradually reducing its long-term JGB purchases as yield curve control ends. Inflation’s rise mostly looks like normalisation to us, too—not anything to be overly concerned with.

Exhibit 1: 10-Year JGB Yields and Japan CPI

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But when yields rise swiftly, in Japan or elsewhere, headlines often shift into overdrive, proclaiming their bearishness. In Japan, financial publications we read fixate on its gross debt-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratio, which exceeds 200%—the developed world’s highest.^[ii] Couple that with alarm over potential fiscal profligacy from new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, and they fan rumours the bond market will react negatively and force a reckoning, the alleged reason why yields are rising.^[iii] Rising yields, in turn, sound warnings the long-touted yen carry trade will unwind.^[iv] For the unfamiliar, a carry trade is when global investors borrow cheaply in one nation and plough funds into higher-yielding assets elsewhere. Today, many commentators we follow argue this is propping up global markets.

As always, though, when confronted with such claims, investors should ask themselves: Do they pass muster? A cursory inspection finds them easy to debunk. First, we find debt-to-GDP isn’t a very useful way to measure the presumed burden of Japan’s bond mountain. JGB investors aren’t paid with GDP, but out of government tax revenue.^[v] We think Japan’s interest payments’ share of tax revenue provides a much better indication of its ability to meet its financial obligations by pairing them with incoming receipts. Exhibit 2 shows this remains historically low and has fallen over the past 15 years. There was no Japanese debt reckoning then, so why would there be now?

Exhibit 2: Japan’s Debt Service Isn’t Historically Onerous

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This is why we think JGB investors, the most sensitive to potential default risks, continue to view Japanese credit as rock solid, one reason Japan’s 10-year yields are the developed world’s second lowest, trailing only Switzerland’s.^[vi] As for Japan’s seemingly newfound appetite for government spending, we don’t see Takaichi’s fiscal policy as some big bullish positive. We agree with the criticisms pointing out decades of fiscal stimulus in Japan didn’t create lasting growth. But it probably won’t break the bank, either, in our view.

Meanwhile, as Exhibit 3 illustrates, Japanese and global stocks are rising in concert with long rates—once again debunking fears otherwise. Year to date, the MSCI Japan Index is up 23.0% in yen (16.1% in pounds), whilst the MSCI World Index, the developed world benchmark, has risen 13.2%.^[vii] Rising JGB yields are manifestly not tanking stocks in Japan or globally. Nor is this a new development. They have been rising together for basically the last three years.

Darstellung 3: Japanische Renditen und Aktienkurse steigen seit Jahren gemeinsam

Quelle: FactSet, Stand: 12.12.2025. Rendite 10-jähriger JGB, Rendite des MSCI Japan mit Bruttodividenden und Rendite des MSCI World mit Nettodividenden, beide in EUR, 11.12.2019 – 11.12.2025

Für Anleger ist die Besorgnis über die steigenden JGB-Renditen ein weiteres Beispiel dafür, dass die Allgemeinheit positive Entwicklungen als negativ bewertet. Darstellung 4 illustriert, wie höhere Renditen eine Versteilung der japanischen Zinsstrukturkurve – also des Zinsspektrums von kürzeren zu längeren Laufzeiten – bewirken. Dies begünstigt eine Belebung der Kreditvergabe in Japan, da das Geschäftsmodell der Banken darin besteht, kurzfristig Schulden aufzunehmen und langfristig Kredite zu vergeben, um die Differenz einzustreichen. Die höheren Spreads zwischen den kurz- und langfristigen Zinssätzen liefern ihnen somit einen noch stärkeren Anreiz für die Kreditvergabe. Insgesamt verzeichneten die Bankkredite im November mit 4,5 Prozent im Vorjahresvergleich das schnellste Wachstum seit mindestens 25 Jahren (ohne Notfallkredite im Zusammenhang mit der Pandemie).^[viii] Und insoweit mehr Kredite der Wirtschaftstätigkeit zugutekommen – indem sie Konsum und Investitionen ankurbeln –, tragen sie zu günstigeren Wachstumsperspektiven für Japan bei.

Darstellung 4: Japanische Zinsstrukturkurve erreicht den steilsten Verlauf seit 2006

Quelle: FactSet und Finaeon, Inc., Stand: 12.12.2025. Differenz zwischen den Renditen 10-jähriger und 3-monatiger JGB, Januar 1986 – November 2025

Dementsprechend halten wir die Sorgen über steigende JGB-Renditen für unbegründet. Wir sehen darin ein klassisches Beispiel für grundlose Panik – denn diese Entwicklung ist kein Anlass zur Sorge, sondern eher ein gutes Zeichen.