MarketMinder Europe 

MarketMinder Europe

MarketMinder Europe provides our perspective on current issues in financial markets, investing and economics. Our goal is to analyse key topics in an entertaining and easy to understand manner, helping you see the news of the day in a unique perspective.

Investing in financial markets involves the risk of loss and there is no guarantee that all or any capital invested will be repaid. Past performance neither guarantees nor reliably indicates future performance. The value of investments and the income from them will fluctuate with world financial markets and international currency exchange rates.


A Comprehensive Guide to America's Debt Ceiling Debate

Editors’ Note: MarketMinder Europe favours no party nor any politician. We assess political developments solely for their potential impact on markets, economies and/or personal finance.

Lately, an American political debate over legal limits to the amount of US federal debt outstanding—the debt ceiling—is leading to many headlines on both sides of the Atlantic. These debates have happened relatively frequently in recent years, and as we have found to be normal, headlines speculate about possible financial Armageddon. In doing so, much of the commentary we have read seems quite confused what is—and isn’t—at issue. Here we will go through everything from the basics of the debt ceiling to the details as to why we think those financial Armageddon claims are a stretch, to put it mildly.

What is the debt ceiling, anyway?

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Sunset on Reform Hopes in Japan?

Editors’ Note: MarketMinder Europe is politically agnostic. We favour no politician nor any party and assess political developments for their potential economic and market impact only.

Japan officially has a new prime minister (PM) in waiting, and it is … not the person most observers we follow expected. Heading into yesterday’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership vote, reform minister Taro Kono was reportedly the apparent favoruite, but former LDP Research Council chair Fumio Kishida pulled off an upset with unexpectedly strong support from LDP lawmakers.[i] Presuming he wins a confidence vote in Japan’s parliament (known as the Diet) on 4 October—seemingly a foregone conclusion, considering the governing coalition’s supermajority—he will become the next PM. Japanese shares fell sharply on Wednesday, dipping -1.1% on the day, perhaps partly due to this news.[ii] We wouldn’t be surprised if Japanese shares trail the MSCI World Index over the foreseeable future, either. To us, investors seemed to get too far out over their skis on economic reform hopes when Kono looked like the heir apparent. But now it is Kishida, and reality is seemingly setting in.

When former PM Yoshihide Suga announced on 3 September that he wouldn’t seek re-election as LDP chief in yesterday’s election, commentators we follow swiftly identified Kono as the likely successor. Whilst equity markets in the rest of the world hit a speedbump, Japanese markets rallied, seemingly on the prospects of change, in our view.[iii] When Suga became PM, commentators we follow described him as a proverbial safe pair of hands—a name well known in Japan and a PM who would focus on shepherding the country through COVID rather than rock the boat with reforms that might be unpopular in some corners. In most developed countries, we think that sort of political gridlock and status quo is generally positive for equity markets, as reforms frequently create winners and losers. But according to our and many other analysts’ research, Japan remains plagued by a number of structural issues that stifle competition amongst companies and domestic demand, including a strict labour code and complex web of cross-shareholdings amongst the major conglomerates. (Meaning, companies form alliances and prevent hostile takeovers by owning large stakes in each other, which—in our view—can reduce board members’ incentives to pursue measures that might foster competition) Throughout Japan’s postwar history, our research shows this system has kept bloated, underperforming companies afloat and stifled competition from new challengers. In our view, is a big reason for the country’s famously weak economy in the 1990s and 2000s.

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Germany Gets Political Gridlock Again

Editors’ Note: MarketMinder Europe is politically agnostic. We prefer no politician nor any party and assess political developments for their potential economic and market impact only.

The results are in, and German voters have elected—wait for it—political gridlock. No party took a majority in Sunday’s federal election, and it is far from clear which party will head the next government and who will replace Angela Merkel as chancellor—as we (and most observers we follow) expected. Coalition negotiations could very well take months. Yet for markets, we think this all amounts to political stability and the extension of the status quo, which we think has long been a fine backdrop for German equities.[i]

Heading into the vote, the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) was polling just ahead of Merkel’s centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU).[ii] Those polls proved more or less right, with the SPD winning 25.7% of the vote and the CDU and CSU combining for 24.1%.[iii] The SPD took a small plurality of the Bundestag’s 735 seats.

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What PMI Pessimism Likely Says About Shares

“The September PMI data will add to worries that the UK economy is heading towards a bout of ‘stagflation.’”[i] Across the English Channel, commentators we follow bemoaned that “the Delta variant of coronavirus hit demand and supply-chain constraints pushed input costs to a more than two-decade high.”[ii] Japan’s results allegedly “underscor[ed] the protracted impact of the coronavirus pandemic,” whilst America’s supposedly showed “persistent supply-chain problems hit activity.”[iii] Reading those takes on September’s flash purchasing managers’ indexes (PMIs, preliminary business surveys tallying the breadth of economic growth that are based on 85% – 90% of the final survey’s responses), you might think these data point to contraction in many parts of the developed world. But if so, that isn’t what the data show, as we will explain. Why the dour reaction, and what should investors make of it? Here we help put commentators’ latest PMI pronouncements into perspective.

September’s flash PMIs did broadly tick down from August. (Exhibit 1) But all remain well above 50, signalling expansion—except Japan’s, which hasn’t posted an expansionary reading since April (and, before that, January 2020).[iv] So for the US, UK, eurozone, Germany and France, September’s downticks don’t imply contraction—they just suggest growth wasn’t quite as broad-based as last month’s.

Exhibit 1: Major Economy PMIs

Source: FactSet and IHS Markit, as of 24/9/2021.

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The Knee-Jerk Lesson From Last Week’s Evergrande Story

Editors’ Note: MarketMinder Europe does not make individual security recommendations. The below merely represents a broader theme we wish to highlight.

Here is a tidbit so run-of-the-mill it seemingly shouldn’t merit mention: Global equity markets rose 0.7% in price terms last week.[i] Perhaps this seems typical, even boring. But in our experience, typical, boring weeks don’t start with markets falling -1.1% amidst warnings that a too-big-to-fail Chinese property developer is about to miss big debt payments (i.e., default), allegedly sparking a financial crisis in China and sending shockwaves globally.[ii] That was the general tenor of the financial commentary we encountered last Monday. Now here we are one week later, and the events we saw so many warnings about actually came closer to happening—yet markets seemingly shrugged it off. In our view, this is the latest example of the dangers of reacting to negative headlines.

At last week’s outset, financial commentators globally argued the world was on the precipice and that a default by Evergrande—a massive Chinese property developer—would cause a financial crisis in mainland China, potentially wrecking markets globally. We saw some analysts cite pure financial risks, via developed-world banks’ potential exposure to Evergrande’s roughly $300 billion (£219.9 billion) in debt.[iii] Others warned the company’s collapse would implode Chinese real estate markets, spurring a sharp economic downturn. When the company announced on Wednesday it had reached an agreement to pay the roughly $36 million (£26.4 million) in interest owed to onshore investors, the general reaction from commentators we follow was, yah but just wait for that $84 million (£61.6 million) payment due to overseas investors on dollar-denominated debt Thursday.[iv] Meanwhile, according to several reports, the central government indicated it had no plans to bail out the company and directed local governments to step in with targeted support for local businesses and homeowners only if absolutely necessary to prevent protests and other disorder.[v]

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Don’t Put Too Much Stock in Monetary Policy Institutions’ Forecasts

Will the European Central Bank (ECB) raise interest rates sooner than expected? That is a question several financial publications we follow asked after Financial Times reported the ECB anticipates hitting its 2% year-over-year inflation target by 2025 based on internal, unpublished research.[i] We have seen some market observers speculate that if this projection lands true, that would fulfill the ECB’s purported conditions for considering raising interest rates—which could mean the ECB hikes rates as soon as 2023’s close. Whilst that timeframe may sound distant relative to the present, we have seen analysts argue it is much earlier than most experts anticipate, sending some scampering to recalibrate their outlooks. However, we caution investors against putting too much stock into monetary officials’ forecasts—they aren’t blueprints for future monetary policy, in our view.

We have seen a broad mix of responses to the revelation of the ECB’s internal research, ranging from recommendations to refrain from concluding anything concrete to questions about the monetary policy institution’s transparency. Our takeaway is much more high-level: Monetary policy decision-making isn’t a clear-cut process. We don’t find it surprising monetary officials consider a host of information, including internal research, and the ECB’s economists are likely running through myriad scenarios and hypotheticals that could influence policymakers’ thinking. However, these additional inputs and perspectives don’t necessarily make the ECB’s forecasts extremely telling, in our view.

We can test this by reviewing their past forecasts to see how they aligned with what actually happened. Consider the Eurosystem staff’s—which comprises both the ECB and the eurozone’s national monetary policy institutions—three-year forecast of gross domestic product (GDP, a government measure of economic output) and inflation (the general rise in prices economy-wide) issued in December 2016. Their estimates for 2017 – 2019 were mixed—occasionally close and occasionally quite off. (Exhibit 1)

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How to Defend Against a Rising Tide of Ponzi Schemes, Identity Thieves and NFT Fraud

Recently, the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority reported British consumer losses due to fraudulent activity have tripled over the last few years to £570 million (at least according to official records).[i] Similarly, America’s Federal Trade Commission logged 2.3 million fraud cases in 2020, totalling $3.4 billion (£2.5 billion) in losses, up markedly from 2019.[ii] Notably, younger folks reported falling prey more often than older people (although the latter’s median loss was much higher).[iii] It seems financial ploys that make off with investors’ cash are, sadly, a recurring phenomenon. Whilst the particular techniques may change, our coverage suggests their underlying structure stays mostly the same over time, which we think you can learn to recognise. Here we run through some of the latest approaches criminals have used to abscond with people’s funds—and offer some lessons on how to protect yourself against this rising tide.

Plain-Vanilla Ponzi: Last month, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) uncovered an alleged Ponzi scheme (when earlier investors are paid out with new investor money without their knowledge) that swindled over $110 million (£81 million) from more than 400 investors in 20 states.[iv] Just as history’s largest Ponzi run by Bernie Madoff collapsed more than a decade ago, another was apparently taking off.[v] Whilst there isn’t anything particularly innovative about this investment scam, in our view, as Ponzis date back decades and regularly crop up, it suggests they remain all too prevalent despite society’s repeated opportunities to learn better.

As the SEC complaint goes, one John J. Woods hatched the vehicle for his Ponzi—Horizon Private Equity—in 2007.[vi] But what really seemed to get it rolling was in 2008, when he bought an investment advisory firm, Southport Capital, from a wealthy family and took advantage of trust and relationships there that he hadn’t built himself. Southport then began peddling Horizon, Woods’ fictitious fund, which advisers told clients would guarantee them 6% to 7% returns. The SEC alleges Woods used Horizon as “his own personal piggy bank.”[vii]

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Canadians Pick the Status Quo

Editors’ Note: Our political commentary is intentionally nonpartisan. We favour no politician nor any political party and assesses political developments for their potential economic and market impact.

Well, that was anticlimactic. Five weeks after Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau dissolved Parliament and called a snap election in hopes of his Liberal Party winning an outright majority, the results are in: The Liberals remain in power, but they still have a minority government and will have to rely on help—chiefly from the leftist New Democratic Party (NDP)—to get anything done. Moreover, three of Trudeau’s cabinet ministers lost their re-election bids, and many onlookers are grousing about the indecisive campaign, potentially leaving the government with less political capital than they had going in. Most coverage we have seen dwells on the political optics and Canadians’ reported frustration with being asked to vote during the middle of the Delta variant’s surge. For equities, we think that is all sociology and beside the point—what matters for returns to an extent, in our view, is that political uncertainty has eased and gridlock within Canada’s Parliament likely persists for the foreseeable future.

Exhibit 1 shows the latest tally of the results and how they compare to the last parliament. With 98% of votes counted, the Liberals have gained just three seats in the House of Commons, whilst the Conservatives have no net change. The real losers, we guess, were independents, who had five seats in the previous Parliament and have none now. Close on their heels are Green Party leader Annamie Paul, who came in fourth in her race as her party lost support nationally, and the People’s Party of Canada—a right-leaning party started by former Conservatives frustrated with party leadership—which won zero seats.

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Putting China’s Evergrande Saga in Perspective

Editors’ Note: The following discussion covers developments involving individual companies and, as such, please note that MarketMinder doesn’t make individual security recommendations. Specific securities are solely discussed herein to help illustrate and explain our view of the potential broader impact of developments.

A holiday kept China’s equity markets closed on Monday, but that didn’t stop fears of a Chinese real estate developer potentially failing to pay interest on its debt (i.e., defaulting) from roiling sentiment globally, driving global equity markets to drop -1.1% on the day.[i] Many financial commentators we follow globally warned that China Evergrande Group, with its roughly $300 billion (£219.9 billion) in debt, faces default.[ii] Some argue this could be China’s version of Lehman Brothers’ collapse in 2008, triggering a financial crisis that would be a most unwelcome Chinese export. Whilst a default is looking likely, in our view, there are many reasons to question the theory the outcome would be so bad: Our research and study of history show China has the means, motive and opportunity to prevent big fallout; markets are likely well aware of the situation; and we doubt it presents a material global risk.

Evergrande, China’s largest property developer, began life in 1996 as the Hengda Group, headquartered in Guangzhou. The company’s chief business is residential real estate development—it claims to have nearly 2,800 projects in 310 Chinese cities (chiefly, apartments).[iii] But it isn’t limited to this. The company also has businesses engaged in electric vehicle (EV) production, healthcare and a theme park, among others. All in all, Evergrande has roughly 200,000 employees, and many more Chinese investors are likely exposed to Evergrande through its corporate debt securities and other debt investments called wealth management products (WMPs).

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The Great Electricity Shock: Manufacturing Edition

Europe’s electricity woes stayed in headlines globally Thursday and Friday, this time with the news several British factories were starting to cut back due to soaring electricity costs. Two fertiliser plants owned by a US company announced indefinite closures, steel plants revealed they were idling during peak hours, and a survey showed about two-thirds of UK factories worried about energy prices impacting their operations.[i] Analysts at one big US financial firm warned Continental Europe could face similar fallout, especially if winter is colder than usual.[ii] Several financial commentators we follow warned the associated fall in manufacturing output could jeopardise the economic recovery from lockdowns not just in the UK and Europe, but globally. In our view, this thesis falls apart when you gather a few basic facts, and we don’t view the current troubles as a major economic or equity market risk.

It does logically follow that if a factory closes fully or in part for any length of time, it will reduce output. We aren’t dismissing that or the impact on the affected businesses, workers and communities. But we think extrapolating anecdotes into widespread trouble is a well-travelled road to error, as companies can adapt in different ways. Fertiliser companies were likely the first to close outright because chemical production is one of the most electricity-intensive segments of the manufacturing industry—one US research report put it at the top of the list a few years back, responsible for just over 20% of manufacturing’s total electricity use.[iii] Iron and steel were fourth, at just over 6%.[iv] Transportation equipment, which has a heavy presence in the UK (e.g., autos and aircraft), uses a smidge less than that. Food and beverage production, also big in Britain, is much further down the list. (No word yet on how this has impacted electricity-intensive cryptocurrency mining—stay tuned for that, we guess.)

Rather than zero in on specific industries, we think it is more helpful to take a higher-level view and consider a country’s overall sensitivity to electricity costs. One way we do this is to scale manufacturing as a percentage of GDP, then compare it to services, which is overall much less energy-intensive. (GDP, or gross domestic product, is a government-produced measure of economic output.) In the UK, manufacturing was just 8.7% of GDP in 2019, which we use instead of 2020 to avoid lockdown skew.[v] Services, by contrast, was a whopping 70.9%.[vi] Not that services are immune to high electricity prices, but it generally costs a lot less to keep the lights on at a hair salon or keep the computers running at a bank than it does to keep complex automated assembly lines running.

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Investing in financial markets involves the risk of loss and there is no guarantee that all or any capital invested will be repaid. Past performance neither guarantees nor reliably indicates future performance. The value of investments and the income from them will fluctuate with world financial markets and international currency exchange rates.

This article reflects the opinions, viewpoints and commentary of Fisher Investments MarketMinder editorial staff, which is subject to change at any time without notice. Market Information is provided for illustrative and informational purposes only. Nothing in this article constitutes investment advice or any recommendation to buy or sell any particular security or that a particular transaction or investment strategy is suitable for any specific person.

Fisher Investments Europe Limited, trading as Fisher Investments UK, is authorised and regulated by the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA Number 191609) and is registered in England (Company Number 3850593). Fisher Investments Europe Limited has its registered office at: Level 18, One Canada Square, Canary Wharf, London, E14 5AX, United Kingdom. Investment management services are provided by Fisher Investments UK’s parent company, Fisher Asset Management, LLC, trading as Fisher Investments, which is established in the US and regulated by the US Securities and Exchange Commission.