MarketMinder Daily Commentary

Providing succinct, entertaining and savvy thinking on global capital markets. Our goal is to provide discerning investors the most essential information and commentary to stay in tune with what's happening in the markets, while providing unique perspectives on essential financial issues. And just as important, Fisher Investments MarketMinder aims to help investors discern between useful information and potentially misleading hype.

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Why the US Is Helping Prop Up Japan’s Weak Currency

By Eshe Nelson, The New York Times, 8/4/2026

MarketMinder’s View: Look, we haven’t bugged US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s office, and we aren’t clairvoyant, so we don’t actually know the specific reasons the US helped Japan’s Treasury with its intervention to strengthen the yen. But we don’t think the reasoning posited here (and many other places) passes muster. The argument goes like this: Since Japan is the country with the largest stockpile of US Treasury bonds and yentervention by Japan’s Treasury would generally require selling dollars and buying yen, this piece suggests the US stepped in to keep Japan from dumping a boodle of Treasurys and driving US borrowing costs skyward. If that is indeed the reason, it is a silly one, because this is hardly the first time Japan has intervened to support the yen. They did so earlier this year. And in 2024. And and and. None of these efforts ended with sky-high US Treasury yields and debt doom. Or, for that matter, with Japan’s pile of US Treasurys diminished—Japan still owns a little more than it did at the end of 2023, per the US Treasury’s data. As for parallel chatter that the US did this to curb its trade deficit with Japan, feeding on the myth that a weak currency makes Japan’s exports boom and imports sag, US exports to Japan hit a fresh high last year despite the weaker yen. This whole saga strikes us as a tempest in a teapot.


US States Sue Trump Administration Over New Tariffs on 60 Trading Partners

By Edward Helmore, The Guardian, 8/4/2026

MarketMinder’s View: Here we go. “A coalition of 25 US states sued the Trump administration on Monday over new tariffs pegged at 10% to 12.5% on goods from 60 trading partners, calling them a pretext for replacing import taxes struck down by the supreme court in February. The states are asking the US Court of International Trade to halt the tariffs, declare them unlawful and order refunds of duties that have already been paid.” President Donald Trump enacted these tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which lets the White House apply tariffs against countries whose trade laws discriminate against US goods. The White House argues the new tariffs, aimed at countries with no or unenforced laws against importing goods made with forced labor, fits Section 301 parameters. The states disagree, and it now seems the courts will decide. As always, we are neutral in political matters like this, preferring no party nor any politician and assessing developments for their market and economic implications only. And in this case, we think there is little to see. Markets moved on from tariff news long ago, barely blinking at the February court decision, refund orders and replacement tariffs. We guess completing the legal process here will ease some uncertainty about these latest tariffs’ staying power, however it goes. But businesses seem to have shrugged it all off long ago, swallowing the added tariff burdens and moving on.


US Factory Activity Expands at Strongest Pace Since 2022

By Jeffrey Sparshott, Bloomberg, 8/3/2026

MarketMinder’s View: Some more positive news for America’s factory sector, as the Institute for Supply Management’s July manufacturing purchasing managers’ index (PMI) rose to 55.6 from June’s 53.3, marking its highest reading since May 2022 (50.0 marks the line between expansion and contraction). The report was broadly strong as all but one industry (chemical products) showed growth, and the forward-looking new orders subindex ticked up from 56.0 to 56.7—a positive sign for future production. Export orders notably improved, jumping from June’s contractionary 48.5 to 53.0. Note this broad improvement happened despite raw materials prices still rising swiftly (easing just slightly from 73.0 to 71.1), illustrating demand’s resilience in the face of higher costs. Now, it is worth noting PMIs measure only growth’s breadth, not its magnitude, and their backward-looking nature renders them largely moot for stocks’ direction ahead. This reading also contrasts somewhat with S&P Global’s manufacturing PMI, which matched June’s three-month low at 53.9 and showed softer new orders growth and declining international sales. But both surveys showed continuing factory growth in July, defying pundits’ worries at the war’s outset.


Why the US Is Helping Prop Up Japan’s Weak Currency

By Eshe Nelson, The New York Times, 8/4/2026

MarketMinder’s View: Look, we haven’t bugged US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s office, and we aren’t clairvoyant, so we don’t actually know the specific reasons the US helped Japan’s Treasury with its intervention to strengthen the yen. But we don’t think the reasoning posited here (and many other places) passes muster. The argument goes like this: Since Japan is the country with the largest stockpile of US Treasury bonds and yentervention by Japan’s Treasury would generally require selling dollars and buying yen, this piece suggests the US stepped in to keep Japan from dumping a boodle of Treasurys and driving US borrowing costs skyward. If that is indeed the reason, it is a silly one, because this is hardly the first time Japan has intervened to support the yen. They did so earlier this year. And in 2024. And and and. None of these efforts ended with sky-high US Treasury yields and debt doom. Or, for that matter, with Japan’s pile of US Treasurys diminished—Japan still owns a little more than it did at the end of 2023, per the US Treasury’s data. As for parallel chatter that the US did this to curb its trade deficit with Japan, feeding on the myth that a weak currency makes Japan’s exports boom and imports sag, US exports to Japan hit a fresh high last year despite the weaker yen. This whole saga strikes us as a tempest in a teapot.


US States Sue Trump Administration Over New Tariffs on 60 Trading Partners

By Edward Helmore, The Guardian, 8/4/2026

MarketMinder’s View: Here we go. “A coalition of 25 US states sued the Trump administration on Monday over new tariffs pegged at 10% to 12.5% on goods from 60 trading partners, calling them a pretext for replacing import taxes struck down by the supreme court in February. The states are asking the US Court of International Trade to halt the tariffs, declare them unlawful and order refunds of duties that have already been paid.” President Donald Trump enacted these tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which lets the White House apply tariffs against countries whose trade laws discriminate against US goods. The White House argues the new tariffs, aimed at countries with no or unenforced laws against importing goods made with forced labor, fits Section 301 parameters. The states disagree, and it now seems the courts will decide. As always, we are neutral in political matters like this, preferring no party nor any politician and assessing developments for their market and economic implications only. And in this case, we think there is little to see. Markets moved on from tariff news long ago, barely blinking at the February court decision, refund orders and replacement tariffs. We guess completing the legal process here will ease some uncertainty about these latest tariffs’ staying power, however it goes. But businesses seem to have shrugged it all off long ago, swallowing the added tariff burdens and moving on.


Warsh Considers Reducing Frequency of Fed Policy Meetings

By Colby Smith and Ben Casselman, The New York Times, 8/3/2026

MarketMinder’s View: “The Federal Reserve’s 12-person policy committee meets eight times a year and votes on whether to lift, lower or hold borrowing costs. [New Fed head Kevin] Warsh raised the idea of changing the frequency of those meetings at the Fed’s gathering this week, according to four people with knowledge of the discussion who were not authorized the speak publicly.” Now this is all just a rumor, which the Fed hasn’t confirmed, and it may come to nothing. The Fed could mull meeting fewer times, then keep the status quo. Either way, this article does a decent job giving the current lay of the land, in the process showing why the official meeting frequency isn’t as important as you might think (even if the article says otherwise in places). For one, the existing statutes mandate only a minimum of four meetings per year, which Warsh has already said is too seldom. And whatever the number the Fed chooses, it can meet ad hoc to deal with rapidly changing conditions as policymakers see fit—as it did during the first rumblings of subprime mortgage trouble in the mid-2000s, the acute phases of the global financial crisis in 2008, COVID lockdowns in 2020 and more. These guys and gals are really good at having last-minute conference calls. So we disagree with the notion that fewer Fed meetings could reshape “the way the Fed steers the economy and potentially making it less responsive to changes in inflation and the labor market.” (Setting aside our major disagreements with the idea the Fed or anyone “steers” a market economy.) As the article also notes, any three Fed members could schedule a meeting when they see fit. And given how much Fed people yap between meetings, we doubt fewer meetings actually means less “transparency,” which hasn’t done anything for Fed credibility or policy success anyway. Overall, a less talkative Fed looks like a big opportunity for reality to exceed dreary expectations. For more, see today’s commentary, “Digging Into Last Week’s Fed ‘Credibility’ Concerns.”