Daily Commentary

MarketMinder’s View: Well, we sure have a lot of quibbles with this piece. It argues the inflation pressure stemming from rising oil prices means the Fed, Bank of England and other central banks won’t “look through” potentially temporary inflationary pressures to support markets and the economy with easier policy, which it deems problematic as “Modern markets have gotten used to central bank support whenever the global economy wobbles.” But hold the phone. Give us an example from the last 20 years of a central bank stepping in to actually arrest a market decline. Didn’t happen in 2008, when the Fed and others cut rates and launched quantitative easing (QE) that autumn. The bear market intensified and ran through March 2009, with a recession continuing to Q2 2009’s end. In 2022, Fed hikes were part of the negative shock cornucopia that drove the bear market, which ended in October 2022—and the Fed kept on hiking dramatically for months thereafter. Ditto for other global central banks. Where was the “help” then? In the 2000 to 2002 bear market, most Fed cuts fell between January 2001 and January 2002. The bear market ran through October 2002. Even in 2020’s odd, COVID-lockdown induced bear market, the Fed was cutting for months before the crisis began. That didn’t forestall the market decline and sudden recession. Point being: Central bank intervention or action can help economies at times of stress. It isn’t necessary or some all-important factor assured to blunt a decline. It may do nothing more than foster panic! So whatever central bankers decide to do with respect to the Iran war, the key is to not overrate the importance. While a monetary policy error could be negative, the absence of easing in the face of perceived market pressure doesn’t really qualify as such.

MarketMinder’s View: Yes, Canada’s final January and advance February retail sales predate the war in Iran and associated oil price spike, so they are old in that regard. You could say that about every economic data point ever published, though. And there still is some value in reviewing releases—to help understand the extant trends coming into the present. In Canada, recession fears have dominated over the past year, tied to tariffs. Q4 2025 GDP’s -0.2% (per Statistics Canada) fed that narrative anew. “However, the January update and advance estimates for February — also about a one per cent increase — indicate retail sales volumes for the first quarter of 2026 could post their strongest quarterly gain since the fourth quarter of 2024, Andrew Grantham, senior economist at Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, said in a note. Sales were up in six of nine subsectors and led by a two per cent rebound at motor vehicle and parts dealers, following a 1.6 per cent decline in December.” So it would appear the contraction in Q4 may not extend into the new year, undercutting some fears. It all suggests the Canadian economy was on better footing than appreciated before the war—and the dismissal of growth data suggests a wider, war-driven gap between sentiment and reality is opening, fueling positive surprise before long.

MarketMinder’s View: Fund flows aren’t predictive of market direction, but they do offer an imperfect window into investor sentiment—and this illustrates how sentiment has soured since the war began in late February, with outflows in each of March’s three reported weeks. And, “U.S. equity funds witnessed the largest weekly net sales in nearly 2-1/2 months in the week to March 18 as expectations of higher ‌oil prices, a hotter-than-expected inflation reading and the Federal Reserve's cautious stance dampened hopes for rate cuts this year. Investors shed U.S. equity funds of a net $24.78 billion in their largest weekly net sales since $25.89 billion divestments ⁠in the week to January 7, LSEG Lipper data showed.” Souring sentiment shows markets are pre-pricing the war as normal. It all lowers expectations, facilitates positive surprise and suggests stocks will move on well before most expect.