Personal Wealth Management / Economics

Something for Everyone in August US Inflation

Fed watchers’ inflation fixation remains rampant, but markets have moved on.

August US consumer price index (CPI) data hit the wires Friday, with the headline rate holding at 3.4% y/y.[i] Coming mere days before the Fed’s September 15 – 16 meeting, most coverage viewed it through that lens, with many convinced the inflation rate means a hike is now a near certainty—a factor many wrongly fear spells trouble for stocks. Let us review the data to help illustrate why we think a hike would be a mistake—but no disaster for markets.

Elevated headline inflation was all about energy, as the CPI’s energy component rose 16.3% y/y with gasoline up 27.4% and fuel oil 52.0%.[ii] But outside energy, as Exhibit 1 shows, inflation continues trending lower with “core” (excluding food & energy) CPI sliding to 2.4% y/y, a five-year low. Now, August’s monthly headline CPI accelerated to 0.4% m/m from July’s 0.1%—again, led by energy—but that just underscores monthly oil price volatility amid ongoing Middle East conflict, not broad inflation trends. Monthly core inflation also ticked higher to 0.3% m/m from 0.2%, but this was mostly due to a one-off jump in wireless carriers’ pricing plans (which added 0.10 percentage point to core CPI), highlighting monthly volatility rather than widespread and rampant price increases.

Exhibit 1: Core Inflation Rate Slowing
Line chart with two solid lines showing Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Core Consumer Price Index (Core CPI, which excludes food and fuel) inflation rates from 1960 through 2026.
β€’	Y-axis: Percent, ranging from -4% to 16%.
β€’	X-axis: Years from 1960 to 2026.
β€’	Lines:
o	Dark green solid line: CPI.
o	Gold solid line: Core CPI.
β€’	CPI (dark green line):
o	Begins near 1% in 1960 and remains relatively low through most of the early 1960s.
o	Rises sharply in the late 1960s and early 1970s, reaching approximately 6% by the early 1970s.
o	Surges during the mid-1970s, peaking near 12%.
o	Falls briefly before rising again to the chart's highest level of approximately 15% around 1980.
o	Declines rapidly during the early 1980s to roughly 3%.
o	Fluctuates mostly between 2% and 6% during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
o	Remains generally between 1% and 4% from the mid-1990s through the 2010s.
o	Falls below 0% around 2009, reaching approximately -2%, the lowest value shown.
o	Moves mostly between 0% and 3% during the 2010s.
o	Surges sharply in 2021 – 2022, reaching approximately 9%.
o	Declines thereafter and ends near 3% in 2026.
β€’	Core CPI (gold line):
o	Begins near 2% in 1960 and follows a smoother path than headline CPI throughout the period.
o	Rises through the late 1960s and early 1970s, reaching approximately 6%.
o	Climbs to almost 12% in 1975 before falling in the late 1970s to around 6% and then rising to about 14% in 1980, its highest level.
o	Declines sharply to 3% in 1983 before rising into a roughly 4% to 6% range through the mid-1980s and early 1990s.
o	Falls steadily from 3% in the mid-1990s to 2% in the late 1990s.
o	Fluctuates mostly between 1% and 3% from the early 2000s through 2021.
o	Increases during 2021 – 2022, peaking at 6.6%.
o	Declines afterward and ends near 2.4% in 2026.
β€’	The two series generally move together, though CPI is more volatile than Core CPI, exhibiting larger spikes and declines.
β€’	The most significant inflation episodes occur during the 1970s and early 1980s, when both measures reach double-digit rates, and again during 2021 – 2022, when CPI peaks near 9% and Core CPI peaks at 6.6%.
β€’	By 2026, both inflation measures have moderated to roughly 3%, well below their historical peaks.
Source: FactSet, as of 9/15/2026.

For broad inflation to take off, money supply growth would need to surge. As Nobel laureate Milton Friedman taught, inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon caused by too much money chasing too few goods and services. Broad US M4 money supply grew 7.9% y/y in July, far slower than June 2020’s 30.5% zenith. And, while that rate is slightly above the long-term average, broad money supply figures globally are growing far slower, suggesting the tinder for inflation is lacking.[iii]

But that doesn’t mean we know what the Fed will do—no one does. We see arguments going every which way, and the data could support almost any conclusion you like. Those advocating for hikes point to headline CPI’s energy-driven acceleration thinking (incorrectly, to us) that will spread to other categories. Others point to core CPI, noting the underlying trend’s ongoing deceleration when making the case for the Fed to hold. The split not only shows how folks’ interpretation of the same data can diverge, but Fed members’ too! For investors, none of this is telling except for helping gauge sentiment.

But notice a key missing piece in this debate: The Fed has little ability to control energy prices (or carriers’ wireless pricing plans for that matter). A rate hike would likely be quite ineffectual in that regard. Some even work politics into that, saying a hike would assert Fed independence (itself a political rationale). Or that the Fed shouldn’t hike this close to an election—also political. All the competing claims and interpretations add up to one central point: No one can know what the Fed will do. Speculation over what amounts to differences in opinion is pointless. Not that Fed decisions don’t matter, but we suggest waiting for policymakers to actually make one, as it is a mistake (and unnecessary) to guess what the Fed might do.

Meanwhile, you can assess various interest rate scenarios—and financial conditions—without needing to divine Fed intentions. While we think a hike would be an error, the scope of it would be pretty small today. Fed rate moves affect banks’ short-term funding costs, which can influence lending—and economic growth—by raising or lowering the spread between their funding costs and the rates they charge on new loans. While the Fed controls some short rates, the long-term rates banks lend at are market set. So even if the Fed hikes, banks still have plenty of incentive to keep credit flowing if long rates stay above short, as spreads remain positive.

Exhibit 2 shows the yield curve—the difference between short and long rates, a proxy for banks’ new loan profitability—is the steepest in four years. A rate hike or three wouldn’t invert it. Bank lending, currently rising 7.3% y/y through September 2 and near its fastest clip in over three years, is likely to remain profitable for the foreseeable future even with a few hikes, fueling expansion.[iv]

Exhibit 2: Steep Yield Curve Cushions Against Fed Hikes
Line chart showing the spread between the 10-Year US Treasury Yield and the Federal Funds Target Rate (upper limit) from 1971 through 2026, with US recessions shaded in light green.
β€’	Y-axis: Percentage Points, ranging from -10 to 6 percentage points.
β€’	X-axis: Years from 1971 to 2026.
β€’	Dark green solid line: 10-Year Treasury Yield Minus Fed Funds Target Rate (Upper Limit).
β€’	Light green shaded vertical bars: Periods designated as recessions.
β€’	A horizontal reference line marks 0 percentage points, separating positive and negative spreads.
Trend Overview:
β€’	The spread fluctuates widely over the 55-year period, alternating between positive and negative values.
β€’	Positive values indicate the 10-Year Treasury yield exceeds the Federal Funds rate.
β€’	Negative values indicate the Federal Funds rate exceeds the 10-Year Treasury yield, commonly referred to as an inverted yield curve.
1970s and Early 1980s:
β€’	The spread begins near 2 percentage points in the early 1970s.
β€’	It falls sharply during the 1973 – 1975 recession, reaching approximately -5.5 percentage points, before rebounding to 3.6 percentage points in 1975 after the recession ends.
β€’	The most extreme inversions occur around 1980 and again in 1981, when the spread drops near -8 percentage points, the lowest level shown on the chart.
β€’	Following these inversions, the spread rebounds above 3 percentage points by the early 1980s.
Mid-1980s Through Early 2000:
β€’	The spread remains mostly positive, fluctuating between 0 and 4 percentage points.
β€’	Brief inversions occur around 1989 – 1990 and 2000 – 2001, where the line dips slightly below zero ahead of 1990 and 2001 recessions.
β€’	Peaks near 4 percentage points occur in the early and mid-1980s and 1990s.
2000s:
β€’	The spread recovers sharply and reaches approximately 3.5 to 4 percentage points between 2002 and 2004.
β€’	The spread again falls below zero during 2006 – 2007, immediately before the 2007 – 2009 recession.
2010s:
β€’	Following the financial crisis, the spread remains firmly positive, generally between 1 and 4 percentage points.
β€’	Values gradually trend lower through the latter half of the decade.
β€’	It falls below zero in 2019.
2020s:
β€’	After a brief 2020 recession, the spread rises above 2.5 percentage points in 2022.
β€’	It falls below zero in late 2022, reaching approximately -2 percentage points, marking the deepest inversion since the early 1980s outside that period.
β€’	The spread remains mostly negative through 2025.
β€’	It subsequently recovers, crossing back above zero and rising toward 1 percentage point by 2026.
Relationship to Recessions:
β€’	Most recessions shown on the chart are preceded by periods in which the spread falls below zero.
β€’	Notable inversions occur before the 1973 – 1975, 1980 – 1982, 1990 – 1991, 2001, 2007 – 2009, and 2020 recession periods.
β€’	The chart highlights the historical tendency for recessions to occur after or during extended periods of yield-curve inversion.
Source: FactSet, as of 9/15/2026. 10-Year Treasury yield minus fed-funds target rate (upper limit), 1/8/1971 – 9/14/2026.

Looking globally, the evidence rate hikes hobble economies and stocks right now is also slim. Central banks often demonstrate a remarkable degree of groupthink. We have already seen three Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) quarter-point moves upward and the European Central Bank (ECB) follow suit with two. With long rates above short there—and globally—their economies are chugging along. And since the RBA started hiking rates in February, the ASX 200 (Australia’s benchmark equity index) is up 1.5% in Aussie dollars. From the ECB’s initial June move, eurozone stocks have risen 1.9% in euros.[v]

So as much as we think rate hikes are neither needed nor likely to prove effective, a Fed mistake (or three) wouldn’t be a calamity. While worth watching, it doesn’t require an immediate response.



[i] Source: BLS, as of 9/11/2026.

[ii] Source: BLS, as of 9/11/2026.

[iii] Source: Center for Financial Stability, as of 9/15/2026.

[iv] Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, as of 9/15/2026.

[v] Source: FactSet, as of 9/15/2026. ASX 200 return with gross dividends, 2/3/2026 – 9/14/2026, and MSCI EMU return with net dividends, 6/11/2026 – 9/14/2026.


If you would like to contact the editors responsible for this article, please message MarketMinder directly.

*The content contained in this article represents only the opinions and viewpoints of the Fisher Investments editorial staff.

Get a weekly roundup of our market insights

Sign up for our weekly e-mail newsletter.

A couple talk with a business woman inside of an office with glass walls

You Imagine Your Future. We Help You Get There.

Are you ready to start your journey to a better financial future?

A dark green book cover with a title that reads "Stock Market Outlook." There is a sub-banner stating "Independent Research & Analysis. Published Quarterly by the Investment Policy Committee" ending with a fisher investments logo at the bottom.

Where Might the Market Go Next?

Confidently tackle the market’s ups and downs with independent research and analysis that tells you where we think stocks are headedβ€”and why.

Learn More

Learn why 210,000 clients trust us to manage their money and how Fisher Investments and its affiliates may be able to help you achieve your financial goals.

As of 6/30/2026

New to Fisher? Call Us.

(888) 823-9566

Contact Us Today